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 Chapter 7 
 Knowing and Not Knowing 
 Nico  Stehr 
 As aptly as these introductory words by Schütz and Simmel summarize my own 
hypothesis on the presumed phenomenon of non-knowledge, 1 I note that it is cap-
tured still more precisely by economist Joseph Stiglitz’s ( 2005 ) formulation about 
the “invisible hand” (p. 133) ostensibly operating in the market place. Asked why 
the invisible hand is invisible, Stiglitz gave a straightforward answer: because it 
does not exist. Similarly, I ask in this chapter why non-knowledge is diffi cult to 
grasp. And my equally analogous response is: because there is no such thing as 
non-knowledge. 
 Not wishing to capitulate already at this early point, I concentrate in this chapter 
on scientifi c discourses in which participants maintain that something like non- 
knowledge does exist. The knowledge/non-knowledge dichotomy appears in many 
discussions on the subject as a kind of performative speech act (Sartori,  1968 ). 
However, it recommends only one side of that which it designates, namely, knowl-
edge. I cannot quite sustain my doubt about the existence of not-knowing; from time 
to time I have to deviate from it and maintain that non-knowledge does exist. At the 
same time, I draw attention to other terms that are empirically and theoretically 
more productive than the naked assertion that non-knowledge exists. Finally, I will 
point to a number of intriguing, but rarely studied topics relating to the question of 
the societal function or societal treatment of apparently insuffi cient knowledge. 
1  My usage of the term  non-knowledge follows the convention in the literature that discusses the 
absence of knowledge. The term is synonymous with  not knowing and has a close affi nity but not 
identity with  ignorance . In German the term is  Nichtwissen . 
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 The outstanding feature of a man’s life in the modern world is 
his conviction that his life-world as a whole is neither fully 
understood by himself nor fully understandable to any of his 
fellow-men. Alfred Schütz ( 1946 , p. 463) 
 In the presence of the total reality upon which our conduct is 
founded, our knowledge is characterized by peculiar limitations 
and aberrations. Georg Simmel ( 1906 , p. 444) 
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 Freud and Hayek: Why Quit? 
 The treatment of non-knowledge by Sigmund Freud and Friedrich von Hayek is of 
particular interest in this context because their approach is, if I am not mistaken, 
quite representative for much of scientifi c discourse. Both Freud and Hayek recog-
nized that there can be no such thing as a researchable subject called non- knowledge, 
but, unimpressed by their own conclusion, they continued to examine something 
that does not exist. Their grappling with this issue gives me the opportunity to ask 
why concerning oneself with the subject of non-knowledge is typical especially for 
the German-speaking scientifi c community. Is it a sort of eccentricity? 
 Freud’s (1924/ 1963 ) theory of the dream as a psychic phenomenon is based on the 
primary conviction that the dreamer himself should “say what his dream means” 
(p. 100). But an evident fundamental obstacle to doing so is that the dreamer is, as a 
rule, fi rmly convinced that he does not know what his dream means. As Freud notes, 
“the dreamer always says he knows nothing” (p. 101). The lack of information from 
the dreamer confronts Freud with an apparent scientifi c and methodological conun-
drum defying sound interpretation of dreams. “Since he [the dreamer] knows nothing 
and we [the psychoanalyst] know nothing and a third person could know even less, 
there seems to be no prospect of fi nding out [the dream’s meaning]” (p. 101). 
 Instead of accepting these fi ndings as a sound conclusion and therefore forsaking 
any further search for the meaning of dreams, Freud (1924/ 1963 ) considered another 
possibility: “For I can assure you that it is quite possible, and highly probable 
indeed, that the dreamer  does know what his dream means:  only he does not know 
that he knows it and for that reason thinks he does not know it ” (p. 101). This inter-
pretation seems to be confusing and self-contradictory. Freud even asked himself 
whether a contradiction in terms might exist in his hypothesis that there are “mental 
things in a man which he knows without knowing that he knows them” (p. 101):
 Where, then, in what fi eld, can it be that proof has been found that there is a knowledge of 
which the person concerned nevertheless knows nothing, as we are proposing to assume of 
dreamers? After all, this would be a strange, surprising fact and one which would alter our 
view of mental life and which would have no need to hide itself: a fact, incidentally, which 
cancels itself in its very naming and which nevertheless claims to be something real—a 
contradiction in terms. (pp. 102–103) 
 For Freud what followed from these observations was the conclusion that one ought 
to abandon this method of dream interpretation as lacking any substance. But Freud 
did not. After all, the knowledge does not really hide from the observer. One has 
only to search for it persistently. “It is very probable, then, that the dreamer knows 
about his dream; the only question is how to make it possible for him to discover his 
knowledge and communicate it to us” (p. 104). 
 Hayek, confronted with a similar dilemma, decided, just like Freud, to ignore it. 
In his essay entitled “The Creative Powers of a Free Civilization” (1960/ 1978 ), in 
which the lack of knowledge is a question of the distribution of knowledge in mar-
kets, Hayek fi rst noted that any progress in civilization is the result of an increase of 
knowledge. In the real world, according to Hayek (1960/ 1978 ), it simultaneously 
holds true that “the individual benefi ts from more knowledge than he is aware of” 
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(p. 22), and he added that “this fundamental fact of man’s unavoidable ignorance of 
much on which the working of civilization rests has received little attention” (p. 22) 
in science. 2 Human knowledge is far from being complete. 
 The key passage in Hayek’s (1960/ 1978 ) analysis of the difference between what 
he called the “boundaries of ignorance” (p. 22) or man’s “unavoidable ignorance” 
(p. 22) and “conscious knowledge” (p. 24) is: “It must be admitted, however, that 
our ignorance is a peculiarly diffi cult subject to discuss....We certainly cannot dis-
cuss something intelligently about which we know nothing” (p. 23). Hayek takes 
recourse to a kind of Münchhausen maneuver: “We must at least be able to state the 
questions even if we do not know the answers....Though we cannot see in the dark, 
we must be able to trace the limits of the dark areas” (p. 23). Nevertheless, as Hayek 
emphasizes, “If we are to understand how society works, we must attempt to defi ne 
the general nature and range of our ignorance concerning it” (p. 23). 
 The Excess Boom in Non-knowledge 
 Despite of the problems that Freud and Hayek quite obviously had with the concept of 
non-knowledge, why has the term resonated so much in the contemporary cultural and 
social sciences, particularly in German-speaking countries? In the media and public dis-
course alike, the category of non-knowledge is increasingly becoming a prominent and 
trenchant monetary unit as the shady side of knowledge, but why is it gaining currency? 
 The boom in refl ection on non-knowledge certainly has to do with the essentially 
controversial concept of knowledge as well as with the common understanding of 
the modern conditions for the production of knowledge, with the societal role often 
attributed to knowledge, and with the theory of modern society as a knowledge 
society. Is the difference between knowledge and non-knowledge an example of the 
typically static conceptual polarity of Old European philosophy? Or is that differ-
ence basically only the widespread cultural criticism that the individual—given the 
extensive and growing volume of objectifi ed knowledge in modern societies and 
given the sophisticated new technical and complicated methods of accessing it—
disposes over only a minute (and probably diminishing) share of all knowledge? 
Are the widely discussed fi ndings on the average voter’s alleged political ignorance, 
stupidity, and disenfranchisement and on the danger it poses to democracy a cause 
of the topicality of the subject of non-knowledge? 
 Is it, on the other hand, unrealistic to assume that the average citizen, including 
the well-educated contemporary citizen, has (or should have) suffi cient  technical 
expertise to intervene, for example, in the complex decision-making on economic 
questions of the goal confl ict between infl ation and unemployment? At root, does 
the concept of non-knowledge merely mean the societally necessary  distribution of 
2  The German wording that Hayek chose as translations of two central concepts in his English 
original is of interest, and is, in my opinion, fully adequate. “The boundaries of his ignorance” and 
“man’s unavoidable ignorance” are rendered as  Grenzen seines Unwissen and  unvermeidlichen 
Unkenntnis des Menschen (Hayek, 1960/ 2005 , p. 31). In other words, there is no reference to non-
knowledge ( Nichtwissen ). 
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knowledge? Does the concept of non-knowledge perhaps refer primarily to the 
future present, about which one is really little informed? Does the origin of the 
boom in observations about non-knowledge lie, under certain circumstances, in an 
overestimation of the societal role of allegedly unquestioned scientifi c knowledge 
and in an underestimation of the societal roles of knowledge? 
 In my view the societal phenomena perceived as non-knowledge can be better 
captured by other terms, such as “systemic ignorance” (Moore & Tumin,  1949 , 
p. 789), that express how a lack of knowledge or information is manifested in mod-
ern societies and how people can deal with knowledge gaps. In any case, two keys 
to recognizing the myth of non-knowledge are the concept of knowledge itself and 
the complicated question of distinguishing between information and knowledge. 
 Knowledge as a Societal Construct 
 The discussion on the concept of non-knowledge often refl ects a liberal intermingling 
of the terms  knowledge and  information . I assume that one should distinguish between 
the two, even if this differentiation is diffi cult to maintain in practice. A lack of infor-
mation is not non-knowledge. 3 Just exactly what knowledge is and how knowledge 
differs from information, human capital, or other intellectual or cognitive characteris-
tics is an essentially controversial question. Neither the concept of knowledge nor the 
manner of knowledge’s production, distribution, use, or consequences can be taken 
for granted. They constitute foregone conclusions, at least for the scientifi c observer. 
 I would like to defi ne knowledge as the capacity for societal action (the capacity 
to act), as the possibility to get something going. Knowledge therefore refers to pro-
cess knowledge. Knowledge is a model for reality. Shannon (1948/ 1949 ), for exam-
ple, explained how words and images can be converted into characters and transmitted 
electronically. He thus contributed to realizing the Digital Revolution. 4 According to 
Shannon, the expansion of knowledge represents a broadening of the horizon of pos-
sibilities. Whether the broadening of the possibilities for action also automatically 
represents an increase in the possibilities for disappointment (often also understood 
to be an increase in non-knowledge) has to be regarded as controversial. Insuffi cient 
knowledge on the part of an individual or a group accordingly means the inability of 
those actors to mobilize knowledge in order to put something in motion. 
3  For instance, Wehling ( 2009 , p. 99) characterizes the insuffi cient information “Does the guest 
arrive at 5 or 6 p.m.?” as a case of non-knowledge. This example is at best vague information, as I 
show more precisely in this chapter. 
4  Dyson ( 2011 ) described Shannon’s case: “In 1945 Shannon wrote a paper, A Mathematical 
Theory of Cryptography, which was stamped SECRET and never saw the light of day. He pub-
lished in 1948 an expurgated version of the 1945 paper with the title ‘A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication’. The 1948 version appeared in the  Bell System Technical Journal , the house 
journal of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, and became an instant classic. It is the founding docu-
ment for the modern science of information. After Shannon, the technology of information raced 




 Knowledge exercises an active function in the societal sequence of actions only 
when action is not carried out in essentially stereotyped habitual (effortless) pat-
terns or is otherwise largely regulated, that is, where there is leeway and the need for 
decisions and where this situation necessitates mental exertion. 5 , 6 The societal prac-
tices in which decisions are possible and necessary represent the ecology of knowl-
edge or, more exactly, of its application. 
 Every implementation of knowledge, not only of great scientifi c experiments, 
requires control of the circumstances of action (the initial conditions) through active 
agents, who, for example, want to translate laboratory successes (or a thought 
experiment) into practice. In other words, when “scientifi c knowledge is to be 
‘applied’ in society, adaptation to the initial conditions prevailing there has to be 
made, or societal practice has to be remodeled according to the standards set by sci-
ence” (Krohn & Weyer,  1989 , p. 354). 7 
 Information and Knowledge 
 I defi ne information in distinction to the concept of knowledge as follows: The con-
tent of information concerns the characteristics of products or results (output, con-
dition, supply), whereas the stuff that science consists of refers primarily to the 
qualities of processes or resources (input, procedures, business enterprises), which 
are used in processes. Knowledge is the capacity to act, whereas information does 
not enable one to set anything in motion. 
 It is just as important to emphasize from the outset that information and knowl-
edge have, to a limited extent, common attributes. The most important basic com-
mon denominator is that neither information nor knowledge can be understood 
independent of societal contexts. In daily life, as in the scientifi c discourse, the 
conceptual interchangeability of information and knowledge is extensive. It is none-
theless notable that public places such as airports, shopping centers, railroad sta-
tions, and highway roadhouses commonly do not have a knowledge stand but rather 
5  A variant of these thoughts worth considering—one quoted by Hayek (1960/ 1978 , p. 22)—can be 
found in Whitehead’s ( 1911 )  Introduction to Mathematics : “Civilization advances by increasing 
the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them. Operations 
of thought are like cavalry charges in a battle—they are strictly limited in number, they require 
fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive moments” (p. 61). 
6  Luhmann’s ( 1992 ) observations about the preconditions for the possibility of making a decision 
may permit a still broader application of knowledge. “One can only decide,” as he very plausibly 
underlines, “when and to which extent it is not certain what will happen” (p. 136). On the premise 
that the future is highly uncertain, the lack of knowledge in decision-making processes can extend 
over many other societal contexts, too, and thereby also to those that are normally characterized by 
routines and habitual behavior. 
7  Hans Radder ( 1986 ) arrived at a similar conclusion when he pointed out that material as well as 
social prerequisites ultimately have to be met for long-term practical success in technical produc-
tion: “The creation and maintenance of particular social conditions (for example, a bureaucratic 
and centralist administration in the case of nuclear energy) is necessary in order to be able to 
guarantee the permanent technological success of a project” (p. 675). 
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an information stand. The blending of these terms will probably continue to prevail 
in practice, in science and everyday life alike, because who can distinguish between 
the information society and the knowledge society? 
 Observing Non-knowledge, and Some of the Questions I Ask 
Myself in the Process 
 With these observations in mind, I try to ascertain what could or could not be meant 
when one speaks of non-knowledge. People’s actions are guided by knowledge. 
Knowledge of others and self-knowledge are prerequisites for socialization. Hence, as 
Simmel ( 1906 ) noted, knowledge is an anthropological constant: “All relationships of 
people to each other rest, as a matter of course, upon the precondition that they know 
something about each other” (p. 441). There can be no societal actors without knowl-
edge. One is just as far from being unknowing  without knowledge as one is naked 
without a headscarf. A society without secrets is inconceivable. Ignoring knowledge 
and information is sensible, even rational. A society in which there is total transpar-
ency is impossible. Knowledge is never created out of nothing. Knowledge, or the 
revision of knowledge, arises out of already existing knowledge (not out of forms of 
non-knowledge). The existence of a  non- knowledge society is just as questionable as 
that of a human society without language. Humans live in a complex society marked 
by a high degree of functional differentiation in which almost all of its members are 
non-knowledgeable about almost all knowledge. Knowledge in the broad sense meant 
in this chapter is not restricted to any particular social system in modern societies. 
Thus, knowledge is everywhere (Luhmann,  1990 , p. 147). 
 It is useful to ignore information and knowledge. Each individual knows that his 
or her knowledge is limited. Yet people profi t a great deal from knowledge they are 
not acquainted with. What indicators could be used to characterize a non- knowledge 
society empirically? Almost half of the American population is convinced that the 
Earth is younger than 10,000 years old. Is the American society for that reason a 
non-knowledge society? 
 Who or what is the standard of comparison when one speaks of the duality of 
non-knowledge and knowledge or of the relationship of knowledge to non- 
knowledge (as  known unknowns )? Is it the individual or rather a collective? 
Privileging the individual is common. To put it more stringently, does the concept of 
non-knowledge mean a single process, a single quality (information), or the progno-
sis of an occurrence? How long must (or can) non-knowledge be perceptibly recog-
nizable in order to be non-knowledge? Can cluelessness, for example, last only for 
seconds? Does one refer to individual forms of knowledge (or information) that the 
isolated individual (e.g., a scientist) or a non-knowledgeable collective does not—
and cannot—have because one always proceeds selectively or is forced to fi lter? 
 Knowledge, by contrast, is a variable societal phenomenon that lies on an indi-
visible continuum and points to the existence of the elementary distribution of 
knowledge in complex societies. No clear-cut difference between knowledge and 
non-knowledge exists. Knowledge is a total societal phenomenon. 
N. Stehr
119
 There is no comprehensive knowledge; nobody can know everything. Acting 
under conditions of uncertainty is commonplace. Knowledge of these gaps is 
knowledge. But knowledge of gaps does not belong in the category of non- 
knowledge if it is a case of negative knowledge (to the extent that one fi nds this 
designation helpful). Actually, one can often close this gap quickly because it is 
possible to know or fi nd out who might know it (a task fulfi lled by the role of 
experts, for instance). On the other hand, there are things that everyone, or almost 
everyone, knows or about which almost everyone is informed (e.g., the fact that 
almost every human has two eyes or that there is such a thing as weather or climate). 
There are a number of expressions that are both empirically and practically more 
productive than  non-knowledge and nonetheless illuminate the horizon of problems 
that non-knowledge allegedly comprises. In the following section I limit myself to 
just one of these possibilities. 
 Asymmetric Information/Knowledge 
 In an infl uential article entitled “The Market for Lemons,” the economist and later 
Nobel Laureate George Akerlof ( 1970 ) paved the way to a systematic analysis of 
asymmetric information by conducting an exemplary analysis of the respective 
information that buyers and sellers of used cars had. An asymmetric state of infor-
mation is one of the fundamental characteristics of various classes of participants in 
the used-car market. As a rule, the owner and the driver of the used car on sale have 
much more detailed knowledge about the dependability and history of the vehicle’s 
mechanical problems than the potential purchaser does. In a credit agreement the 
debtor is guided by certain intentions to repay the credit or not. The lender usually 
has no access to that information. Nor can the lender be certain that the debtor’s 
intended investment will actually be profi table. Generally speaking, asymmetric 
information on the part of market participants should lead to market failure. 
 Buyers and sellers, lenders and debtors are often conscious of the fact that there 
is or can be a state of asymmetric information. It follows that the buyer or lender 
seek indicators that diminish the mistrust in the available information or allow that 
information to be considered more or less reliable. Because the transaction costs of 
the acquisition of relevant information might be high, the very accessibility of the 
information on the seller’s or debtor’s social reputation will likely be an important 
indicator for the lender or buyer. 
 From Akerlof’s deliberations and those of other economists (e.g., Chappori & 
Salanie,  2000 ; Sharpe,  1990 ; Wang,  2012 ), I derive the following general lesson for 
my analysis of the antithesis of information and knowledge: Because societal 
knowledge is scattered asymmetrically rather than evenly distributed, one has to 
assume a cognitive-societal functional differentiation in all societal institutions. 8 
8  In memory research an extreme example of asymmetric information has recently come under 
study—the few people who have “superior autobiographical memory” (Parker, Cahill, & McGaugh, 
 2006 , p. 36), that is, the ability to recall every single day of their lives or to remember the occur-
rences of every single day. 
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In science such a cognitive division is not only perceived as a matter of course but 
is also generally understood to be a functional characteristic of science as an institu-
tion. Not every scientist can work on just any question. And the role of every scien-
tist cannot be classifi ed in relation to itself, but only in relation to that of other 
scientists. It is therefore natural to speak of a cognitive functional differentiation in 
all societal institutions. In other words, it can make sense only to speak of a range 
of knowledge in groups of actors in comparison to symmetrically limited knowl-
edge in other groups of actors, and not of knowledge and non-knowledge. 
 On the Virtues (Advantages?) of Non-knowledge 
 The functional meaning of non-knowledge differs from one societal institution to 
the next. In an institution such as science it is a state of development of knowledge 
that must be overcome, a condition that acts as an incentive. In a highly stratifi ed 
societal institution (e.g., a total institution) differing states of knowledge are a con-
stitutive characteristic feature (a functional necessity) that is defended by all means. 
A society in which complete transparency prevails would be, as Merton (1949/ 1968 ) 
emphasized, “diabolical” (p. 345). In practice, a mutually transparent, complex 
society is unrealistic. 
 Moore and Tulmin ( 1949 , p. 787), in their classical functionalist analysis of the 
societal functions of ignorance, therefore pointed to what in their opinion is the wide-
spread opinion that ignorance is the natural enemy of societal stability and of the 
possibility for orderly societal progress and that every increase in knowledge auto-
matically increases human welfare. A generally positive public attitude toward new 
knowledge, which was widespread in the years immediately following World War II, 
is at present losing ground to growing skepticism about new scientifi c and technical 
knowledge. It is not unusual anymore to encounter the opinion that people know too 
much. Explicit knowledge politics, that is, efforts to police novel knowledge, com-
mences once new capacities for action have been discovered (Stehr,  2003 ). 
 There is a multitude of convincing references to the virtues and advantages of 
ignorance, a lack of knowledge, and invisibility. The discussion and formulation of 
the novel moral principle for an individual’s “right to ignorance” by Jonas ( 1974 , 
pp. 161−163) is clearly germane to a discussion of the political and ethical dilem-
mas generated by the dynamics with which knowledge grows. Jonas’s moral prin-
ciple is opposed by equally formidable ethical demands that insist on a right to 
know, especially at the collective level or from a macroperspective (Sen,  1981 ; 
Stiglitz,  1999 ). In everyday life, sentiments that support the virtue of not knowing 
fi nd expression in such sayings as “What I don’t know can’t hurt me” and “Where 
ignorance is bliss, it is folly to be wise.” 
 Opposition to excessive transparency of one’s own behavior and that of other 
actors, as Merton (1949/ 1968 , p. 343) also emphasized, stems from certain struc-
tural characteristics of societal groups. To these features belong, for instance, the 
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institutionally sanctioned, but in reality also limited, negligence in complying with 
or enforcing existing social norms. The characteristics also include psychologically 
determined, variable opposition to maximum behavioral transparency (Popitz, 
 1968 , p. 8). 9 In modern society technical and legal barriers and these conditions for 
opposition preclude an unlimited investigation of the behavior and convictions of 
individual actors—about whom one would like to know everything. The alleged 
goodwill or maliciousness of the thought police is irrelevant. For instance, new pos-
sibilities for avoiding technically mobilized monitoring keep turning up. 
 Popitz ( 1968 ), on the other hand, pointed to the  disencumbering function that 
limited behavioral information has for the system of sanctions. 10 Limiting the avail-
able or requested behavioral information—a decision that is tantamount to relin-
quishing sanctions—is also a sort of “indeterminacy principle of social life” (p. 12). 
It “opens a sphere in which the system of norms and sanctions need not be taken 
literally without obviously giving up its claim to validity” (p. 12). 
 Lastly, there is a further (primarily cognitive) function of insuffi cient knowledge. 
It has repeatedly been claimed that knowledge arises from non-knowledge, or that 
non-knowledge can be transformed into knowledge. Just how this transformation is 
supposed to happen is scarcely addressed, however. The hypothesis that knowledge 
originates in non-knowledge as it were, in nothing ( ex nihilo ), completely overlooks 
the societal genealogy of knowledge, such as the close, even intimate relationship 
between scientifi c and practical knowledge. The birth of a scientifi c discipline is no 
parthenogenesis. The hypothesis of the transformation of non-knowledge into 
knowledge favors certain knowledge in that the origin of new knowledge is simply 
suppressed. 
 The Societal-Cognitive Functional Differentiation 
Between Non-knowledge and Societally Determined 
Knowledge Gaps 
 One of the self-evident realities in a modern society, with its functionally differenti-
ated cognitive structure, is that individuals, societal groups, and societal institutions 
have long since given up as an illusion the wish, or the hope, for their knowledge to 
be self-suffi cient. Limited knowledge alleviates. Knowledge is unequally 
9  Inasmuch as the disregard and sanctioning of existing social norms by certain incumbents of 
societal positions of a group is known, it must be decided whether “the basic formal structure of a 
group is being undermined by the observed deviations of behavior. It is in this sense that authorities 
can have  excessive knowledge of what is actually going on, so that this becomes dysfunctional for 
the system of social control” (Merton, 1949/ 1968 , p. 343; emphasis added). 
10  In this respect I note that the expression  non-knowledge ( Nichtwissen ) in the title of Popitz’s 
treatise does not appear a single time in the text. The work’s title may be the work of the publishing 
house. The exposition shows that Popitz rightly avoided the term  non-knowledge and more guard-
edly wrote of limited behavioral information and limited behavioral transparency. 
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distributed. As a rule, managers do not themselves have the technical knowledge of 
their employed laborers, engineers, or assembly-line workers. 11 Despite this lack of 
knowledge, managers still become managers. 
 Knowledge gaps or incomprehensive forms of knowledge distribution,  not non- 
knowledge, are a constitutive element of functionally differentiated societies. 
Asymmetrical stocks of knowledge do not lead to society’s collapse. A society’s 
ability to act competently is not a function of the knowledge and information of 
isolated individual actors. A competent actor, for instance, as a politically active 
citizen, need not be comprehensively informed as an individual. 
 A society without this fundamental limitation, without this cognitive functional 
differentiation, is inconceivable. No one has to know everything. But this elemen-
tary fact, which determines the way society is, does not justify the conclusion that 
that non-knowledge is the opposite of knowledge. A being constantly caught up in 
non-knowledge cannot exist. The more collective knowledge increases,
 the smaller the share of all that knowledge becomes that any  one mind can absorb. The 
more civilized we become, the more relatively ignorant must each individual be of the facts 
on which the working of his civilization depends. The very division of knowledge increases 
the necessary ignorance of the individual and most of this knowledge. (Hayek, 1960/ 1978 , 
p. 26, emphasis added) 
 Abandoning the hope for autarkic knowledge, especially the  individual self- 
suffi ciency of knowledge, and giving up the conviction that knowledge is funda-
mentally limited (bounded) entails both costs and benefi ts. But the loss of 
autarky—inasmuch as autarky had ever existed, even in traditional societies—is 
never to be understood as a form of non-knowledge. Societal innovations such as 
the market and the scientifi c or political system help manage knowledge gaps 
(Pérez, Florin, & Whitelock,  2012 ). 
 Relevant functionally differentiated scales of knowledge differ according to fac-
ets such as their respective epoch, the type of society, the pattern of societal inequal-
ity, and the interests of the dominant worldview. 12 In modern complex societies the 
scale of knowledge is longer than in traditional societies. The distance to the sources 
of knowledge is often great. Personal acquaintance with the knowledge producer is 
not necessary. Only in exceptional cases does the knowledge that one does not have, 
but can obtain, include the knowledge that was necessary for the production, legiti-
mation, and distribution of the knowledge acquired. 
11  Collinson’s ( 1994 ) examination of labor resistance—based on two case studies—drew on the 
emphasis that Clegg ( 1989 ) placed on knowledge and information of subordinates and outlines 
generally “the importance of different forms of knowledge in the articulation of resistance” (p. 25). 
Collinson summarized his fi ndings and pointed out that “specifi c forms of knowledge are a crucial 
resource and means through which resistance can be mobilized. Knowledge in organizations is 
multiple, contested and shifting. Employees may not possess detailed underpinnings of certain 
bureaucratic/political processes, but they often do monopolize other technical, production-related 
knowledges that facilitate their oppositional practices” (p. 28). 
12  The concept of the scales of knowledge has a parallel in the concept of the degrees of property 
rights, which are calibrated according to the labor, need, or performance, that is, the merits, of the 




 The current intense debate among social scientists, with its radical polarization of 
knowledge and non-knowledge, is like an echo from a lost world or the wish to be 
able to live in this lost, but secure, world. It was a world in which knowledge was 
reliable, objective, ontologically well-founded, truthful, realistic, uniform, and 
undisputed. It was a world in which scientifi c knowledge was unique and the pro-
fane world of nonscientifi c knowledge was largely disqualifi ed. It was a world in 
which more knowledge alone—such as that which enables one to act successfully 
in practice—was always superior to having no additional knowledge (knowledge 
bias). The world of unquestioned knowledge has vanished. Unclear is whether the 
disappearance of such knowledge is a real loss, as one is evidently supposed to 
believe from talk of the divide between non-knowledge and knowledge, or whether 
it is a form of intellectual emancipation. 
 The difference between knowledge and non-knowledge is an old European 
antithesis with an ancestry harking back to premodern cultures. The old European 
tradition of a dichotomy of non-knowledge and knowledge becomes apparent espe-
cially in the attribution of persons or groups to one of these two categories. Such 
ascription holds that the unknowing person or, more generally, the unknowing social 
class is not only helplessly exposed to the power of knowledge but also pitiable and 
backward. And inasmuch as the occurrence of non-knowledge applies to other 
 societies and cultures, it is foreign knowledge—not one’s own—that is non-knowl-
edge. As described by Fleck (1935/ 1979 ): “Whatever is known has always seemed 
systematic, proven, applicable, and evident to the knower. Every alien system of 
knowledge has likewise seemed contradictory, unproven, inapplicable, fanciful, or 
mystical” (p. 22). 
 For that reason these traditional deliberations on the great divide between knowl-
edge and non-knowledge come nowhere close to resolving the dilemma described 
by Luhmann ( 1991 ): “Is the generally held assumption that more communication, 
more refl ection, more knowledge, more learning, more participation—that more of 
all of this would bring about something good or, in any sense, nothing bad—at all 
justifi ed?” (p. 90, my translation). The emerging political fi eld of knowledge poli-
tics is dedicated to this societal dilemma posed by the risks of knowledge (Stehr, 
 2003 ). 
 One should not insist on an absolute antithesis of knowledge and non- 
knowledge—there is only less or more knowledge and those who know something 
and those who know something else. The practical problem is always to know how 
much or how little one knows in a given situation. A person is not either knowledge-
able or unknowing. A person has more knowledge in one context than in another: A 
person may know a great deal about tax regulations but hardly anything about play-
ing golf. 
 Actors (including scientists) react to complex societal forms by simplifying men-
tal constructs of these relationships. The mental constructs are, in fact, incomplete 
inasmuch as they do not depict reality in its full complexity. These simple models 
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change, react to the unexpected, but are hardly non-knowledge. One of the advan-
tages of liberal democracies is the consciousness that omniscience can be dangerous 
and that safeguarding privacy must remain a form of sanctioned ignorance. 
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